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Ransome, 2004). WPA is very commonly supported by most 
AP hardware. In the WPA scenario, a wireless client is 
provided with a temporary encryption key or 'session key' 
with which it can communicate securely with the AP and 
encrypt/decrypt traffic (Cayirci, Rong, 2009). Once a time 
limit is reached or the session has ended the key is expired 
or exchanged for a new one, making any further use of the 
key invalid (Cayirci, Rong, 2009). This type of protection 
prevents an attacker from viewing traffic or capturing a 
client's key and then using it to impersonate the client. There 
are other types of security of this nature, but they all have 
one thing in common: it is necessary for the client to 
authenticate to the AP in some way with pre-shared 
authentication information.
This study determines if one manufacturer's version of client 
isolation, Cisco System's Public Secure Packet Forwarding 
(Cisco, 2010), prevents wireless devices from launching 
impersonation attacks. The focus of this study is on the well-
known man-in-the-middle IP ARP spoofing attack (Cross, 
2008). It is generated using a publically available set of 
hacking tools known as Cain & Abel (Oxid, 2011). Since 
Cisco's Aironet access points are widely used throughout 
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INTRODUCTION
The use of Wireless Networking Technologies to 
communicate on the Internet continues to rise every year, 
with public hotspots numbering in the tens of millions 
worldwide (WeFi., 2011). Laptop computers and 
smartphones using the 802.11 (Wi-Fi) protocols make up a 
large number of the millions of wirelessly connected 
devices (Kendrick, 2010). Wireless networking is a 
convenient way to stay connected from remote and 
mobile locations (Bowman, 2003). The usage of Wireless 
Local Area Networks (WLAN) is widely spread due to the fact 
that computers communicate wirelessly, without the need 
for physical cable connectivity (Umar, 1993). Unfortunately, 
since the data is transferred over public airwaves where it 
can theoretically be intercepted by others within range, 
wireless networking creates a unique set of security 
concerns.
Connections between Wi-Fi enabled clients and network 
access points (APs) can be secured through a variety of 
different methods (Ciampa, 2006). One method, Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA), involves using strong data 
encryption and rotating authentication keys (Rittinghouse, 
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the world, and Cain & Abel is free to download from the 
Internet, such a combination seems to constitute a likely 
real-world scenario and test of the premise of client 
isolation protection.
1. Literature Review
In the case of clients using publically available Wi-Fi 
connections, authentication is not only inconvenient but is 
impossible due to a large number of unique visitors. The 
convenience of attaching to a public Wi-Fi network at will 
without hassle is what makes the technology inviting to so 
many people. However, there is a major problem with this 
type of scenario: Public Wi-Fi connections without 
authentication transmit and receive traffic in an 
unencrypted or plain-text fashion. This means that anyone 
listening with a Wi-Fi data capture device can intercept the 
traffic and read its contents. This is not the only issue 
involved. Well known vulnerabilities could allow an attacker 
to place himself/herself in the middle of a user's 
conversation, in effect 'becoming' the user on the wireless 
network (Ali, 2008). There are ways in which this type of 
scenario can be avoided: Through the use of a technology 
called 'client isolation'. Client isolation works on the premise 
that any wireless device connected to a Wi-Fi access point 
must communicate through the AP in order to talk to any 
other device, whether that other device is located on the 
local area network (LAN) to which the AP is connected or on 
the Internet. Using this fact to their advantage, some Wi-Fi 
AP manufacturers make it possible to isolate clients from 
each other by preventing any device associated to the AP 
from talking to any other associated device, using the AP 
transceiver as the moderator. This does not prevent Wi-Fi-
based attacks on the LAN, or LAN data sniffing, but it does in 
theory prevent wireless devices on a particular AP from 
directly attacking and impersonating each other.
In recent years, substantial negatives associated with the 
use of wireless communication technologies have come 
to light. Specifically, a simple social networking account 
hacking tool known as Firesheep, released in October of 
2010, has made international news (Gahran, 2010). 
Firesheep is a freely downloadable extension to the FireFox 
web browser developed by Eric Butler (Butler, 2010). 
Firesheep allows its users to capture other wireless users HTTP 
session cookies, and then access that captured person's 
account information. Authentication attack with Firesheep 
scenario has been previously presented by Miller and 
Gregg (Miller, Gregg, 2011). Although Firesheep is 
designed to allow a quick access to a predefined number 
of social networking sites, its open source nature also allows 
it to be modified for other uses. This tool uses a hacking 
technology known as 'side-jacking' - it does not hijack an 
HTTP session; it only captures the session's cookie to allow 
forging of a new 'side' connection (Leonhard, 2010). Many 
popular social networking sites, such as Facebook and 
Twitter, do not encrypt their communications by default, 
making this sort of attack possible (Vaughan-Nichols, 2010).
There is another form of attack that is not well known to an 
average wireless user. It is far more dangerous and 
disturbing than ones such as Firesheep from a security 
perspective. That attack is known as an ARP spoofing or ARP 
cache poisoning attack.  It is a classic man-in-the-middle 
session hijacking, which can also be executed through 
freely downloadable software such as Oxid's Cain & Abel 
(Sanders, 2010). ARP spoofing allows a malicious user on 
the network to place their computer's network interface 
between a victim and the computer(s) with which they are 
communicating (Graves,  2007). This insertion allows for a 
capture, and possible modification, of all data sent; in 
essence completely hijacking the conversation. A hacker 
can then pose as the intended recipient, corrupt the data 
sent, change that data, or simply just capture it for later use 
(Marcus, 2010). The main difference between this attack 
and the Firesheep attack is that the hijacked users have not 
just inadvertently allowed access to their social networking 
account; they have placed themselves at the mercy of the 
attacker, possibly giving up credit card numbers and/or 
private information, completely unaware of the situation.
Since a Firesheep attack and ARP spoofing require open 
and unsecured wired or wireless communications to 
operate effectively, there is a need to find proper 
protection against such occurrences. The Firesheep 
problem is solvable by the web sites that the users are 
accessing, and some have already taken steps to make 
the required fixes (Marcus, 2010). Encrypting all 
communications between users and servers through the 
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'FREE_WIFI_PSPF', which was secured by PSPF. These two Wi-
Fi connections were accessed by two Dell laptop clients, a 
Dell Precision M4500 which acted as the victim, and a Dell 
Latitude D420 which acted as the attacker. Both Dell 
laptops were configured with the Microsoft Windows 7 
operating system, the latest operating system patches, 
and 802.11G Wi-Fi network adapters. The attacking 
computer was also configured with Wireshark, a data 
packet sniffing freeware product (Wireshark, 2011), and 
Cain & Abel, a freeware ARP spoofing hacking tool (Oxid, 
2011). These and other details are included in Table 1.
The computers used in this study were chosen because 
they are typical computers which might be used by public 
Wi-Fi clients. Dell computers are very commonly used by 
businesses around the world. Windows 7, the operating 
system on these computers was chosen for its 
commonality on most computers sold today - Microsoft 
Windows is the market leader for operating systems, 
holding an almost 90% market share (Brodkin, 2011).
The freeware tools were chosen based on their popularity, 
usability, and availability. Wireshark is a widely known and 
used Ethernet packet capture and analysis tool, once 
named Ethereal, and is freely available to the public for 
download (Wireshark, 2011). Cain & Abel is a well-known 
and commonly used hacking tool suite, which is also 
available for download free of charge (Oxid, 2011). The 
freeware tools were chosen based on their popularity, 
usability, and availability. Wireshark is a widely known and 
used Ethernet packet capture and analysis tool 
(Orebaugh, 2007). Once named Ethereal, it is freely 
available to the public for download (Brodkin, 2011). Cain 
use of web session encryption technologies like SSL 
(Secured Sockets Layer) eliminates the usable capture of 
session cookies in transit, thereby protecting from 
Firesheep. ARP spoofing attacks on an open access 
wireless network are much different in nature (Cross, 2008). 
Since an attacker can intercept users' data, it is possible for 
even encrypted communications to be hijacked (Sanders, 
2010). In such a scenario a different type of security 
technology is needed.
Cisco Systems, a world-wide leader in the manufacture of 
networking equipment (Cisco, 2011), has implemented 
such a technology in most of its wireless access point 
hardware; that technology is known as PSPF, or Public 
Secure Packet Forwarding.  Another non-Cisco term for 
PSPF exists and it is called Intra-BSS (Putman, 2005). PSPF is a 
client isolation technology intended to prevent one wireless 
client from talking to another. This technique is used to 
prevent direct client-on-client attacks, but should also 
prevent session hijacking by stopping spoofed ARP packets 
from reaching the victim. Since Cisco technology is very 
commonly deployed by small to very large businesses, it 
seems like a logical choice to base this research upon. It is 
also possible, through the use of third party software 
products such as ArpOn (Di Pasquale, 2011), for clients to 
protect themselves from ARP spoofing attacks. However, 
many public wireless users are either not skilled or informed 
enough to take such precautions. An effort on the part of 
the network owners to secure the communications of their 
users makes more sense, from a security and efficiency 
standpoint. Implementing the protective solution inside of 
the access point hardware, instead of relying upon the 
users to do it, will secure all users connecting to it, regardless 
of their configurations.
2. Methodology and Setup
To demonstrate the ability of PSPF to protect Wi-Fi clients 
from ARP spoofing attacks, a test attack was simulated 
using two Dell Wi-Fi enabled laptops and a Cisco access 
point. The Cisco access point used in this study was a Cisco 
Aironet model 1232-AG. The access point was restored to 
the factory default configuration, and was configured to 
provide two open access Wi-Fi connections to public 
clients: 'FREE_WIFI', which was unsecured by PSPF, and 
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Table 1. Utilized Hardware and Setup
Victim’s Computer Attacker’s Computer Wi-Fi Access Point
Manufacturer: Dell Dell Cisco
System Model: Precision M4500 Latitude D420 Aironet 1232-AG
Processor Type: Intel i7 Intel Core Duo PPC 405GP
Memory Installed: 8GB RAM 2GB RAM 32K NVRAM
Operating System: Windows 7 Ultimate Windows 7 Pro IOS 12.3(8)JA2
Network Adapter: Intel Centrino 6250 Dell 1490 Dual Band 802.11-G Radio
Web Browser: Internet Explorer 8 Internet Explorer 8 N/A
IP Address: 192.168.13.91 192.168.13.92 192.168.13.1
MAC Address: 00-1B-54-AB-04-3B
Firewall: Enabled Disabled N/A
Modifications: None Installed Wireshark None
Installed Cain & Abel
00-23-15-9B-02-38 00-16-CF-B1-51-B1
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The start of the APR table poisoning can be seen on the 
Figure 4.
Cain & Abel by default is configured to capture and log 
HTTP account credentials and to insert false certificates into 
SSL communications in order to capture and relay that 
traffic. This insertion of false certificates will cause certificate 
warnings on most browsers, since the root certificate 
& Abel is a well-known and commonly used hacking tool 
suite (Wallingford, 2006). It is also available for download 
free of charge (Oxid, 2011).
3. Testing Procedure
The test began by configuring the Cisco access point, as 
described above, with two connections, one with PSPF and 
one without. Both, the attacker and victim computers were 
connected to the AP using the 'FREE_WIFI' non-PSPF 
connection. The attacking computer initiated a Wireshark 
packet capture on the network, which showed ARP 
broadcast data packets coming from the address of the 
victim (Figure 1).
Knowing that the client was connected, the attacking 
computer then launched Cain & Abel, and a network scan 
was performed. There is a Media Access Control (MAC) 
address assigned to every network card. It is a unique 
address by all vendors for every Network Interface Card 
(NIC). The IP and the MAC address of the victim's computer 
was discovered, as well as the MAC address of the subnet 
gateway (Figure 2).
Once this information was logged in Cain & Abel, ARP 
cache poisoning has begun, making the client use the 
attacker as its network gateway. Internet Explorer was 
launched on the victim's computer, connecting to the 
Google website. The attacking computer showed instantly 
that web traffic from the victim had been captured. The 
victim's computer then moved from Google to Gmail, 
where it logged into a test email account, and read a 
message; the SSL encrypted email username and 
password had been captured by the attacker (Figure 3).
RESEARCH PAPERS
Figure 1. Packet Capture without PSPF
Figure 2. Network MAC Scan without PSPF
Figure 3. Credentials for Gmail Account Captured
Figure 4. Start ARP Table Poisoning
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gateway resolved this error, allowing the web session to 
continue unhindered. No data packets intended for the 
victim's computer were captured by the attacker during 
the ARP spoofing phase of the test, and the victim 
remained invisible to the attacker's network scans and 
packet sniffing.
Conclusion
The tests performed in this study show the role of a client 
isolation technology, such as PSPF, in protecting 802.11 Wi-
Fi clients from ARP spoofing attacks. ARP spoofing attacks 
are dangerous in that they are difficult to detect, allow an 
attacker unrestricted access to a victim's network 
communications, and can be easily executed over public 
unsecured wireless connections. Since many people 
around the world use publicly available wireless 
connections to access the Internet, an attack of this sort 
could put their personal and confidential information at risk 
if those connections are not secure.
It was hypothesized that by implementing a client isolation 
security technology on the wireless access point, and 
thereby preventing direct client-to-client communication, 
such attacks would be rendered useless. Since ARP 
spoofing attacks require the attacker to send forged ARP-
reply information directly to the victim in order to corrupt its 
ARP cache, the attack would not work because the victim 
would never receive that information. As an additional 
benefit, the attacker would not be able to send data of any 
kind to other clients, preventing the attacker from scanning 
the access point for potential victims and probing their 
service ports. Further, the victim would also be unable to 
send data of any kind to the attacker, preventing the 
attacker from sniffing potential victims' broadcasts from the 
network. The attacker would be effectively isolated on the 
access point, unable to see other wireless users or their 
network traffic.
Without client isolation the attacker easily saw the 
broadcasts of the potential victim, corrupted or 'poisoned' 
its ARP cache, and misled the victim into relaying its network 
traffic through the attacker's computer. With the client 
isolation technology PSPF enabled on the access point, 
even though the attacker could not see potential victims, it 
was still unable to corrupt the ARP cache of a victim that 
authority of the false certificate will more than likely not be 
trusted by the victim computer. The certificate presented 
by the attacker in this case showed as being valid but 
untrusted; to simulate a user unfamiliar with such 
technology, the warning was ignored. Figure 5 represents 
the insertion of the false certificates.
Later, the test computers were attached to 'FREE_WIFI_PSPF', 
a PSPF secured wireless connection. The Wireshark packet 
capture was launched again, but produced no results from 
the victim computer (see Figure 6). Several packets were 
seen from the gateway, but none of them were from the 
victim's computer, not even a broadcast packet.
Cain & Able was then launched and a network scan was 
again performed. The victim's computer, again, did not 
show up in the scan results. Since the IP and MAC of the 
victim were already logged in Cain & Abel from the 
previous attack, an ARP spoof was attempted using that 
information. The ARP spoofing failed completely (Figure 7), 
producing only a brief denial of service for the victim 
computer. Eventually the victim computer and the network 
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Figure 5. Example of false certificates injected by attacker
Figure 6. Wireshark capture with PSPF enabled
produces no packets from victim
Figure 7. ARP Cache Poisoning with PSPF
enabled fails to poison client routes
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wireless users less vulnerable.
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